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TRANSACTION COSTS IN DEALER
MARKETS: EVIDENCE FROM
THE LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE
ABSTRACT
This paper describes regularities in the intraday spreads and prices quoted bydealers on
the London Stock Exchange. It develops a measure of spread-relatedtransaction costs, one that
recognizes dealers' willingness to price trades within their quoted spreads.This measure of
transaction costs shows that trading costs are systematically related to atrade's size,
characteristics of the trading counterparties, and security characteristics. Customers paythe full
spread on small trades while medium to large trades receive morefavorable execution. Market
makers only discount very large customer wades while dealers regularly discountmedium to large
trades. Inter-dealer trades generally receive favorable execution, and discountsincrease in size.
Market makers do not discount trades with each other over the phone, butdo discount when
wading anonymously using inter-dealer-brokers. Quoted and touch spreads arefalling in the
number of market makers. The rate of decline is interpreted as reflectingeconomies of scale in
market making.
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1. Introduction
New electronic trading technologies have drastically reduced the costs of financial
transactions and put tremendous pressure on financial exchanges to lower their costs.
The London Stock Exchange [LSE] is a prominent example of the changes being made in
response to this pressure- In 1986, theLSE switched from a closed, floor-based, broker-
dealer market to an open electronic quotation system dubbed SEAQ. The LSE's SEAQ
system operates much liketheNASD's NASDAQ dealer system. On SEAQ, compet-
ing market makers post bid and ask prices and guaranteed trading volumes. Although
SEAQ also displays trade information, brokers and dealers still negotiate trades by phone.
Besides changing its systems, the LSE enacted new rules designed to encourage compe-
tition and narrow quoted spreads. These included the elimination of fixed commissions
and member entry barriers, and the adoption of best execution rules. The Exchange
also imposed what it calls mandatory quote volumes. Mandatory quote volumes require
market makers to accept trades equalling two or more percent of a security's average
daily trading volume. To reduce the capital risks associated with large trades, the Ex-
change granted market makers the right to delay their disclosure. During 1991, SEAQ
market makers could delay releasing information on large trades for up to ninety minutes.
Currently, they may delay disclosing them for up to one week!
The LSE's emphasis on liquidity over transparency has renewed debate about whether
such rules affect the costs of financial transactions. A recent IOSCO report (1993) ob-
served that few studies have studied the determinants of transaction costs in dealership
markets. Several empirical studies report substantial inter-security and inter-day vari-
ation in NASDAQ and SEAQ dealer spreads. Few examine the relationship between
spreads and transaction prices, or consider how exchange rules might affect spreads.
This paper uses newly available SEAQ intra-day quotation and transaction data to ana-
lyze the relationship between investor transaction costs and best bid-ask spreads. Using
unique information in the SEAQ data, we show that LSE rules lead dealers tooffer sys-
tematic discounts from posted prices. These discounts vary across traders, securities and
trade characteristics.
We also argue that conventional transaction cost measures do not recognize important
institutional features of dealership markets. On SEAQ, these include mandatory quote
volumes and best execution rules. These rules affect dealers' quoted prices andtheir
willingness to offer traders discounts. Contrary to the assumptions of manytheoreticalReiss andWerner:Text 4
models, SEAQ market makers do not compete by narrowing (symmetric) quotes. Indeed,
they almost never narrow the quoted spread between their bid and ask prices. They
instead compete by positioning their bid or ask on or at the market bid or offer. Curiously,
they may maintain these positions for hours or days, offering traders discounts instead
of changing what they advertise on SEAQ screens. We find, as some theoretical models
do,thatdealer discounts usually increase with the size of a trade. We also find puzzles.
Surprisingly, discounts for customers, brokers and market makers all decrease with market
maker concentration and increase with market depth. These heterogeneities raise new
theoretical and empirical questions about how dealer competition affects the relation
between quoted prices and transaction prices.
Section 2 begins with a review of prior research on transaction costs, particularly
transaction costs in dealer markets. We then show that several standard transaction cost
measures may over- or under-represent dealer discounts from quoted spreads. We illus-
trate our arguments using SEAQ and NASDAQ intra-day trade and quotation data for
Cadhury & Schweppes, a heavily traded FTSE-100 equity. We find that SEAQ Cadbury
quoted bid-ask spreads are slightly higher than NASDAQ spreads. More notable are dif-
ferences in the price discounts offered by NASDAQ and SEAQ market makers. Though
some research suggests that dealers only offer other dealers discounts from quoted prices,
this is not true on SEAQ. SEAQ market makers grant discounts to medium and large
retail orders more often than they do to each other. The median retail discount increases
uniformly in order size, and applies to many orders larger than the Ca.dbury manda-
tory quote volume. We conclude the Cadbury example by developing a new measure
of transaction costs, what we term the adjusted apparent spread. This measure reveals
how dealers regularly vary spreads and discounts with the characteristics of trades. We
estimate these adjusted apparent spreads using quantile regression techniques. These
regressions flexibly describe the distribution of Cadbury discounts conditional on trade
size and the identities of traders.
Section 3 analyzes 1991 quotation data for 1,887 UK and Irish equities to isolate inter-
and intra-security variations in quoted prices. We find striking variation. Best bid-ask
spreads range from less than one percent of share value to over fifty percent! Much of
this variation is systematic. As on NASDAQ, quoted and best bid-ask spreads decline
as the number of posting market makers increases. It also appears that the greater the
capital risk associated with mandatory quote volumes, the more market makers widen
their spreads. Dealer participation in actively "making the market" also falls as turnoverReiss and Werner: Text 5
increases. At any instant, nearly one-third of the market makers in a heavily traded
equity post non-competitive prices. White our empirical methods do not disentangle the
interplay between dealer concentration, spreads and volume, we examine whether trade
size economies or order processing costs could explain these correlations. We find limited
evidence that they do.
Section 4 analyzes a smaller sample of sixty SEAQ securities divided equally among
three market capitalization classes. Conventional transaction cost statistics imply that
each capitalization class has best bid-ask spreads comparable to NASDAQ spreads. Our
conditional apparent spread measures show that transaction costs for individual securities
differ substantially because of differences in the extent of discounting. Some of these
differences occur because trade characteristics differ across market capitalization classes.
For instance, FTSE-100 equities appear to have lower transaction costs because they have
relatively more discounted inter-dealer trades. Other differences occur because market
makers and brokers charge different customers different prices. The median customer
trade is never discounted by market makers, but non-registered dealers give their median
customers substantial discounts. We also show that market makers appear unwilling to
give each other price breaks over the phone, but do when trading anonymously through
inter-dealer brokers. Finally, we find some evidence that large orders receive greater
discounts in less concentrated markets.
2. Measuring Transaction Costs in Dealer Markets -
Investorsincur several types of transaction costs each time they trade. These in-
clude commissions, differences between purchase and sale prices, and costs related to
the price impact of trades. This paper exclusively analyzes differences between purchase
and sales prices. We analyze spreads largely because the LSE does not regularly moni-
tor commissions. In 1991, the Exchange estimated that commissions on trades between
£50,001-ulOO,000 averaged 0.23 percent of price. Smaller round lots paid as much as
6.11 percent, and orders greater than £1,000,000 an average of 0.15 percent.1 These
commissions only accentuate the spread-related size discounts we report below.
Prior theoretical and empirical market microstructure research has devoted consider-
able effort to modelling how market makers set spreads. Most conceptual models focus
on a single market maker or specialist. These models show how factorssuch as limit
order competition and a trade's size affect specialists' spreads. Many models, for in-Reiss and Werner: Text 6
stance, conclude that larger trades will be charged larger spreads. In inventory models
this occurs because of inventory risk; in adverse selection models it occurs because large
trades move prices.2
Empirical research on the determinants of spreads has struggled with the question
of how to estimate transaction costs when transaction prices differ from dealers' posted
quotes. Much of this research relies on NYSE intra-day transaction and quotation data.
This research reveals that specialists vary their spreads in systematic ways (e.g., Broth
and Kleidon (1992), Mclnish and Wood (1992), and Foster and Viswanathan (1993).)
These findings have inspired new theoretical models of trade between different types of
investors and market intermediaries.
Fewer papers have modelled the behavior of market makers in dealer quotation mar-
kets. Models by Ho and Stoll (1983), Grossman and Miller (1988), Glosten (1992),
Madhavan (1992), Biais (1993), Dennert (1993), and others show that strategic interac-
tions among market makers can considerably complicate relationships between spreads
and tradecharacteristics.Consider, for example, the conclusion cited above that special-
ists will charge large orders larger spreads. In dealership markets, such a policy would
give large traders an incentive to split trades among dealers. Absent centralized informa-
tion on the identities of traders, dealers will have a harder time identifying and pricing
informed trades. Recently, Glosten (1993) has shown that minimum tick sizes may sim-
ilarly constrain dealers' abilities to charge large orders high spreads. His model also
provides some intuition for how SEAQ mandatory quote volumes -may affect spreads.
By forcing dealers to accept large and small tradd at the same price, SEAQ manda-
tory quote volume rules give market makers incentives to widen spreads. By widening
spreads, SEAQ market makers can protect themselves against inventory imbalances and
informed trades while simultaneously retaining an option to offer execution within their
guaranteed quotes. What is unclear is whether competition will force market makers to
offer discounts. Studies of NYSE specialists suggest that they only offer small orders
discounts. Large floor trades receive less favorable execution at or outside the bid and
ask .
Fewstudies have examined the relation between quoted prices and transaction prices
in dealer markets. Some descriptions of NASDAQ claim that only inter-dealer or Instinet
transactions trade within the quoted spread. A recent study by the LSE's Quality of
Markets Group estimated that nearly thirty-five percent of SEAQ trades occur withinReiss and Werner: Text 7
the best-bid ask spread.4 Some researchers speculate that these are inter-dealer trades.
Others interpret this statistic as evidence that SEAQ quoted prices do not contain much
information. The LSE's Quality of Markets Review and Neubergerand Schwartz (1989)
report that not all trades within the spread are dealer trades. The analysis below shows
that while many trades within the best bid-ask spread on SEAQ are inter-dealer trades,
large customertrades also receive favorable execution. Small and very large trades usually
do not.5 These comparisons do not show, however, whether other characteristics also
affect discounts. We now explore whether trader identities and other factors affect SEAQ
transaction costs.
Cadbury €1 Schweppes —AnIntroductory Example
We begin ouranalysisof SEAQ transaction costs by analyzing what conventioüal
transaction cost measures reveal about the cost of trading Cadbury & Schweppes, a
heavily traded FTSE-100 stock. We analyze Cadbury for several reasons. First, by
focusing on a single security we can more clearly describe SEAQ trading rules that might
affect transaction costs. Second, during the period we study Cadbury & Schweppes
market makers had to accept trades as large as £100,000 —quitelarge by NASDAQ
and SEAQ standards. Third, Cadbury & Schweppes shares also trade on NASDAQ as
American Depository Receipts. This dual trading of Cadbury shares allows us to compare
transaction costs in two very similar dealer markets.
The Cadbury SEAQ data come from separate settlement and quotation records main-
tained by the LSE. The NASDAQ data come from the Institute for the Study of Securities
Markets. Subsequent sections and a Data Appendix describe these data in greater detail.
Table 1 provides conventional descriptive statistics on Cadbury transactions during 1991.
The top section of the table contains transaction cost statistics developed in prior stud-
ies. Following convention, we express each as a percentage of Cadbury's average share
price. For comparison, we also convert each to a pound sterling estimate of the spread
cost on a median size SEAQ trade. (Roughly 1,500 shares.) These measures convey
very different impressions of transaction costs, both on the same exchange (reading down
columns) or between exchanges (reading across pairs of columns). SEAQ spread-related
cost estimates range from 0.54 to 0.85 percent, a difference of £18 on the average trade.
NASDAQ cost estimates range from 0.47 to 0.71, a difference of £13.5. On both a-
changes, the difference between the best bid and ask is clearly a weak upper bound on
costs. The average discount from the best bid or ask on SEAQ is 0.07 percent, or roughly.fleiss and Werner: Text 8
£4.4 on a median-size trade.
Comparing spreads across exchanges, we find that NASDAQ has lower spread-related
transaction costs. The best bid-ask statistics show that on a median-size SEAQ trade,
NASDAQ traders save £8.2 ! The value-weighted NASDAQ measures also show that
large NASDAQ trades receive substantial discounts from quoted prices. When one ex-
cludes trades outside the best bid-ask and weights spreads by value, however, it appears
that there is not a substantial difference between SEAQ and NASDAQ. The distribution
of trade values about the best bid-ask prices provides one possible explanation for the dif-
ference narrowing. Although SEAQ has wider best bid-ask spreads, a larger percentage of
large SEAQ trades go through inside the best bid-ask prices. The difference between the
SEAQ value-weighted and the unweighted effective spreads suggests that SEAQ transac-
tion costs fall substantially with the size of a trade. The difference between the effective
spreads of £5.3 roughly equals the commission on a £2,300 trade.
Although the statistics in Table 1 suggest that Cadbury traders receive better prices
on NASDAQ, these average comparisons mask systematic differences in NASDAQ and
SEAQ dealer discount policies. The middle section of Table 1 shows how the timing of
trades can affect how one interprets the differences observed in the top section of Table
1. It reports the percentage distribution of the best bid-ask spread weighted by minutes
the markets are open, trades, and trade value. On SEAQ, for example, 26.3 percent of
the time (two hours and six minutes of a trading day) a trader can expect to pay a spread
of four pence. Roughly one-fourth of SEAQ trades and shares transact at this spread.
On NASDAQ, however, the best bid-ask spread is Sound fourpence thirty-nine percent
of the time, yet few trades or shares transact at this spread. There aremany possible
explanations for this phenomenon. NASDAQ traders might be in a better position to
trade when spread costs are low, or NASDAQ market makers might compete more for
trades during high volume periods. Our general point is thataverage transaction cost
measures do not distinguish between these explanations. Another way of making this
point is that these measures do not reveal what the same trade would pay in each market.
In what follows, we propose methods that address this question.
Before developing our measures, we first describe features of NASDAQ and SEAQ that
influence how we construct and interpret our measures. Figures la-id display quotation
and trading histories for Ca.dbury on two arbitrarily chosen days, October 16 and 17,
1991. These figures illustrate where trades occurred relative to the best bid and askReiss and Werner: Text 9
on SEAQ and NASDAQ. The dark horizontal lines are the best bid and offer. London
traders call this the "touch". The dashed vertical lines mark the official open andcloseon
NASDAQ and the unofficial open and close on SEAQ. (Appendix A describes the SEAQ
data and trading procedures in greater detail.) Figure la shows the unique information
we have on SEAQ trades- It displays customer orders, inter-dealer trades, and crossing
trades. Figure lb displays the NASDAQ data. Like most publically available data, the
NASDAQdata do not identifytrade counterparties. Figure la shows that the SEAQ
touchdoesnotvary muchduring thecourseof the trading day. Most customer trades
(dots and triangles)gothrough at the touch. By contrast, many dealer trades (circles
andstars)receive execution within thetouch.Thefigurealso shows thatSEAQmarket
makers do not use a fixed tick size rule when offering discounts. The black stars represent
inter-dealer broker [1DB] trades executed on one of four anonymous electronic bulletk
boards. The four 1DB systems provide services similar to those offerred to NASDAQ
dealers by Instinet. Generally, it appears that SEAQ trades are distributed randomly
throughout the day and there are no obvious anomalies when NASDAQ opens. On both
days, at least one customer sell order executes outside the touch. These trades seemingly
violate SEAQ's best execution rule (See the Data Appendix.).
During this period, sixteen SEAQ market makers and over twenty-five NASDAQ
market makers posted quotes and took trades. Though not pictured, each SEAQ market
maker had a quoted spread of five pence. That is, the difference between their quoted
bid and ask prices was five pence. Cadbury market makers maintained this spread
virtually the entire year!6 Since the market touch was four pence or less on these two
days, no SEAQ market maker ever simultaneously posted at the best bid and best ask.
Unfortunately, we do not have similar information for NASDAQ. Other studies, however,
suggest that NASDAQ market makers are rarely post both the best bid and ask (See
Chan, Christie, and Schultz (1993).)
Comparing contemporaneous touch spreads, we see that SEAQ has a slightly larger
spread on October 16 and a smaller one on the 17th. These differences are not large
enough to cause arbitrage.7 Figures Ic and id provide information about the size of
trades. In each we have scaled the area of the circles to represent the number of shares
traded. These figures suggest that in contras,t to the NYSE, some but not nearly all large
trades execute inside the touch. The 1DB trades and broker trades are also larger than
the average customer trade. Finally, the figures suggest that large inter-dealer trades
usually, though not always, execute within the spread.Reiss and Werner: Text 10
Estimating Transaction Costs —AdjustedApparent Spreads
Table 1 and Figures la -idtogether reveal substantial differences in transaction
spreads. The obvious challange is to devise measures that isolate these differences. Dem-
setz's (1968) original work suggested one should interpret the quoted spread as a security
dealer's price for immediacy. In theory, the price of immediacy is the difference be-
tween an investor's purchase or sales price and the asset's "true" or "immediate" value.
As Demsetz and others note, researchers and dealers rarely know an asset's true value.
There is little agreement among researchers, however, on how to define or measure imme-
diate value. The definition we adopt is the instantaneous cost of a round-trip transaction
—whatwe call the apparent cost or apparent spread incurred by simultaneously purchas-
ing and selling shares. We adopt this definition because it follows Demsetz's concept of
immediacy and because it pairs the costs of comparable trades. The obvious practical
problem with our definition is that one rarely observes comparable simultaneous buy and
sell orders. To understand how we overcome this problem, we briefly summarize other
approaches.
Prior researchers have measured transaction costs by averaging best bid-ask spreads
or by inferring implicit spreads from neighboring transaction prices. Figure 2a illustrates
several problems with these approaches. For simplicity itpresumes that the touch is
constant. As in Figures ic and id, the areas of the circles represent each trade's size.
The effective spread at time t —1,2 x E1_1, measures transaction costs as the deviation
of price from the touch midpoint. This measure implicitly assumes that the midpoint
is the asset's "true value", or that the discount on- a reverse transaction would receive
the same discount. Since on SEAQ the same dealer rarelyposts both the best bid and
ask, it is unclear why the touch midpoint is the best way to measure a SEAQ security's
true value. Indeed, the Cadbury data reveal that theaverage of dealers' quotes can
differ substantially from the touch midpoint. For instance, occasionally fifteen market
makers will be at the ask and only one at the bid. Do these positions signal that the touch
midpoint is not the "average" or true price? This question is difficult to answer. However,
we would like in principle to have a measure of transaction costs that incorporates this
information, since the positions of dealers may affect their willingness to offer discounts.
Figure 2a also displays another popular measure of spread-related transaction costs,
those based on differences in neighboring buy and sell transactionprices. At time t, Al',
measures the difference between a small buy and a large sell order. This implicit spreadReiss and Werner: Text 11
measure has theadvantage that itdoes not require quotation information. The figure,
however, reveals a potential drawback, Since it compares the discounts of different size
trades, it can mask size discounts. The same caveat applies to spread measures proposed
by Rot! (1984) and others. These measures estimate spreads from serial covariances
of transaction price changes. Although subsequent research has refined Roll's measure
to a!low for drifting spreads and dealer inventories, few studies condition these serial
covariances on other observable trade characteristics, such as order size. Some studies
also have used regression analysis to condition price changes on past price changes and
trade characteristics.8 These regressions, however, usually do not relate price changes to
information about the touch or dealers' quotes.
Figure 2b illustrates how we propose to use trade characteristics and price informa-
tion to develop a measure of transaction costs. The figure displays a sell order receiving a
discount D from the best quoted bid. We define the apparent spread on this transaction,
AS, as the difference between the transaction price (Ps) and the quoted ask. The appar-
ent spread provides an upper bound on transaction costs because SEAQ's best execution
would guarantee a reverse purchase execution at or within the ask. An obvious ques-
tion is, Why is the quoted ask the appropriate benchmark for the reverse (round-trip)
transaction? Aside from SEAQ best execution rules, there is no guarantee that a market
maker will execute the reverse buy order at the touch.
Since we do not observe the reverse discount, we propose to estimate it. One possible
estimate of what a market maker might offer is the discount D on the customer's original
sale. If this discount is applied to the ask, we obtain the effective spread. If this discount
is applied to a dealer's ask price above the market ask, then we can obtain a price
that is outside the touch. This assignment rule therefore can violate the Exchange's best
execution rule. Since there is little reason to believe that the same dealer will execute the
reverse transaction at the same discount, we propose an econometric model of discounts
that uses past information to predict what dealers would offer under current conditions.
Using this model, we construct an estimate of the reverse transaction discount liand
then define the round-trip transaction cost as the adjusted apparent spread; that is, the
difference between the apparent spread and the estimated discount, i.e. A7S =AS—D.
The key element of our approach is the econometric model that predicts discounts
using trade information. Ideally, we should develop this model from a rich theory that
predicts how dealers use information to set spreads and discounts. Formally, we would likeReiss and Werner: Text 12
to know the structure of D =D(ft), wherefl represents Che market maker's information
at the time of trade. Because we are unlikely to observe everything in fl, we must adopt
an alternative model. We formulate a conditional prediction model by assuming discounts
are random draws from a density
(1) f(Djw)
Here f represents the observed density function of discounts and lagrepresentsour infor-
mation. By examining how the observed conditioning variables lJgaffectf, we hope to
identify what factors determine dealer discounts, and thus transaction costs.
In principle, we could a variety of statistical techniques to estimate how the condi-
tioning variables lagaffectf. We chose to use quantile regressions. These regressiops
describe how the quantiles (or percentiles) of Dvary with cue. (See Koenker and Basset
(1978).). We chose conditional quantiles over means primarily to minimize the influence
of misclassified trades, a problem present in most intra-day transaction data sets. To
underscore the point that these quantile regressions do not produce "structural" esti-
mates of parameters underlying D(fl1), we suppress in what follows the coefficients from
the underlying regressions, favoring instead to report point predictions andapproximate
standard errors. To the extent that we have statistical hypotheses, theyare that par-
ticular variables do not explain observed discounts. In work not reported here,we have
explored the robustness of our predictions using split sample techniques. These checks
convince us that the quantile estimates are reasonably accurate for all butvery large
trades.
Apparent Spreads for Cadhury & Sc/zweppes
To date, we have estimated very simple models of discounts andspreads. In future
work, we plan to experiment with other conditioning variables, such as the direction
of trades. The specifications we report here examine whether and how discountsvary
with the trade counterparties (for SEAQ only), the size of trades, and the touch. While
previous studies have examined the separate impact of the touch and the size of trades,
our specifications allow for interactions between the two. To our knowledge, we are the
first to estimate counterparty effects.
Since we do not use conditioning variables that wouldgenerate asymmetric discounts,
we treat discounts symmetrically by modelling apparent spreads. Weassume SEAQReiss and Werner: Text 13
apparent spreads (AS =Touch-Discount)equal
3
(2)AS1 =Touch—Discount1 = E [flo,a+ fli Touch) x (Trade Sizej)' + q
j=0
wherei indexes types of trades (1DB, customer, market maker andbrokertrades), the fl's
are unknown coefficients and c is an unobserved error. In words, the apparent spreads are
a polynomial in trade size and interactions with the touch at the time of the trade. We
include touch interactions on the right hand side to allow for the possibility that apparent
spreads may depend on the (guaranteed) touch spread. The NASDAQ regressions have a
similar structure. They use quartic polynomials in trade size and do not have coefficients
thatdependon trade types.
Figures 3a-3cplotthe estimated apparent spread quartiles by size of trade, the touch,
and trader identities. To simplify comparisons between SEAQ and NASDAQ, we have
expressed the apparent spreads as a fraction of the prevailing touch. The vertical dif-
ferences between the top horizontal curves and the horizontal axis equal the estimated
apparent spread divided by the touch. The vertical differences between pairs of similarly
shaped curves are the estimated adjusted apparent spreads, our measure of the cost of
an instantaneous round-trip transaction. Figure 3a displays how the median cost for a
SEAQ customer trade depends on the touch and the trade's size. The vertical dashed
lines mark the median Cadbury trade size (approximately £4,500) and the largest size
trade a market maker must accept at their quoted prices (approximately £100,000). The
median size customer trade executes at the touch, no matter what the touch. As Cad-
bury's touch widens from two to three to four pence, the median large customer trade
receives deeper and deeper discounts. At four pence, a trade larger than £1,000,000
receives roughly a twenty-five percent discount (one pence per share or £2,600 total).
These estimates confirm that only very large (usually institutional) trades are likely to
receive discounts. Even these large trades, however, are not assured discounts. The
graphs also show that trade discounts do not widen at the same rate as the touch. That
is, when the touch widens by one pence, the total discount from the bid and the ask
does not increase by one pence. This shows that market makers do not use discounts to
maintain a constant pence spread.
Figure 3b summarizes the variation in customer transaction costs holding the touch
constant at three pence (the sample median.) The three curves represent the first, second
(median), and third apparent spread quartiles. Vertical differences between similar curvesReiss and Werner: Text 14
again equalestimatedadjusted apparent spreads. Note thatthereis nointer-quartile
difference in apparent spreadsat or below the mediantradesize. Inother words,nearlyall
smallretail orders pay the quoted spread. This finding appears at odds with asymmetric
information models that predict small uninformed trades will receive more favorable
execution. Upper quartile customer trades appear to receive no discountup to the
mandatory quote volume of £100,000. Surprisingly, beyond the mandatory quote volume
the dispersion in discounts increases. Nearly twenty-five percent of customer trades larger
than £400,000 receive at least a fifty percent discount, implying the adjustedapparent
spread is zero or negative. The infrequency of large trades, however, reduces the precision
of our estimates.
The frequency with which we observe trades of a giventype and size is the key
determinant of the statistical precision of our estimates. Generally,we observe many
more small trades than we do large, and many more trades at threepence than we do
two or four pence. A plot of apparent spreads by trade size also reveals that market
makers tend to clump discounts in fractionalpence ranges, though the Exchange does
not have tick size rules. To provide an indication of the precision ofour point estimates
across ranges of trade values, we calculated standard errors using Chamberlain's(1993)
suggested approximations. These estimated standard errors confirm that the(point)
precision of our estimates in Figure 3b deteriorate as the size of the trade increases. At
the median trade size, the standard deviation of the medianapparent spread to touch
ratio is 0.02. Thus, at a touch of threepence, a ninety-five percent confidence interval
for the median apparent spread is 2.79 to 2.91pence. For transactions near £150,000,
the standard deviation rises to 0.04, by £300,000 it is0.10, and by £400,000 it equals
0.19. Thus, we do not estimate apparent spreadsprecisely beyond two to three times the
mandatory quote size (L100,000).
Figure 3c shows the estimated distribution of spreads forNASDAQ holding the touch
constant at three pence. We estimate that more thanfifty percent of NASDAQ trades
execute at the touch and thus receive no discount. Lowerquattile trades receive discounts
at most sizes. The NASDAQ quartilesare more curved than SEAQ quartiles, with
discounts of fifty percent effectivelyeliminating the spread for trades over £150,000. At
larger sizes, the discount diminishes and thenappears to increase. Since we observe few
trades in this range, we do not attach muchsignificance to this increase. For now, we
tentatively conclude that NASDAQ and SEAQ market makers haveroughly comparable
discount policies.Reiss and Werner: Text 15
Finally, Figure 3d displays how the median spreads of 1DB, market maker-to-market
maker, and dealer-to-dealer (or market maker) trades vary with a trade's size. Our
calculations assume the touch is three pence. Because the SEAQ data do not identify
which of the two SEAQ dealers initiates a trade, we classify dealer trades as buy (sell)
orders based on whether the observed price is above (below) the touch midpoint. The
vertical dashed line indicates the mandatory quote volume. Each type of inter-deal trade
has a median size roughly equal to the mandatory quote volume. The median market
maker-to-market maker trade below £400,000 pays the full spread. This is perhaps
not too surprising since dealers negotiate these trades over the phone and market makers
cannot tell whether the order is for the market maker or a customer. When market makers
deal anonymously with each other using inter-dealer brokers, however, they discount the
spread by about one-third, or one pence. This also is not surprising since 1DB us&s
purchase for (sell from) their own account so that they can subsequently sell to (buy
from) a customer. SEAQ brokers seem to grant market makers and other brokers deep
discounts. The median broker discount reaches a maximum of more than than one-third
the touch, or one pence, for trades around £540,000. Curiously, we observe few broker
trades compared to the number of market maker-to-market maker trades.
3. Inter-Security Variations in Quoted and Touch Spreads
The Cadbury example suggests that transaction costs vary systematically with trader
identities and order sizes. This naturally leads us to question whether the Cadbury
example is representative of SEAQ transaction costs. Ideally we would like to answer
this question by using quantile regressions to estimate which factors affect each SEAQ
security's adjusted apparent spread. These calculations would allow us to distinguish
between security, security class, and exchange specific variations in transaction costs.
Unfortunately, our data and econometric methods currently do not allow us to analyze
a large sample of SEAQ securities. The main obstacle we face is the time required to
match separate transaction and quotation records. The Exchange transactions records,
for example, require extensive checking to identify 1DB trades and to match "shape"
trades. (See the Data Appendix.)
Although we continue to work toward a longer term goal of matching all SEAQ
quotation and transaction data, this paper examines two narrower SEAQ samples. This
section analyzes the fourth quarter 1991 quotation records of 1,887 UK and Irish equities.Reiss and Werner: Text 16
The main advantage of this sample is its broad coverage. These securities accounted for
over 95 percent of 1991 SEAQ trading volume. its main drawback is it only contains
quotation information. Consequently, we can only make statements about how quoted
prices and volumes vary across securities. The next section uses matched quotation
and transaction dataonsixty of these securities to find whether customers pay quoted
spreads.
TheRelation Between Spreads and Dealer Concentration.
The Cadbury results suggest that we should find differences in spreads across secu-
rities, if only because the size of trades and characteristics of traders willvary across
securities. The main issue we address here is, are there other factors thatmay cause
residual differences. We can think of several, including the inherent riskiness of secu-
rities, the amount of total trading volume, and the number and identities of market
makers.
Previous studies of NASDAQ spreads have found significant cross-section variation
in best bid-ask spreads. Much of this variationappears related to trading volume, with
spreads declining rapidly as share volume increases and dealer concentration decreases.
Some researchers interpret these relations as evidence of the benefits of marketmaker
competition. That is, market makers compete harder when there are more market mak-
ers. Other researchers attribute the decline to the high cost of marketing low volume
equities. What is unclear is why do dealers of low volume stocks have high costs? Given
the similarities in the SEAQ and NASDAQquotation systems, we also might expect to
see spreads on SEAQ securities fall as trading volume increases. Indeed,we do. This
raises the issue, how should one interpret the rate at whichspreads decline? Our answer
is that the decline reveals the economies of scale in marketmaking.
Several rules introduced by the Exchange in themid-eighties encourage market maker
competition on SEAQ. First, the Exchange allows free entry into marketmaking provided
market makers have adequate capital. Second, theExchange also allows market makers
to quit or add securities on short notice. Third, themajor costs of making markets, the
market makers' time and capital, are largely fixed and not sunkcosts. Together, these
conditions suggest that even market makers for small volume stocks facesubstantial (po-
tential) competition. Provided there is some slope to the demand forany individual
market maker's services, this competition will result ina familiar monopolistic competi-Reiss and Werner: Text 17
Lion equilibrium: competitive entry will make each market maker's demand curve tangent
to their average dealing cost curve. If trading volume in a stock increases, competing mar-
ket makers will enter, and reestablish the tangency condition. Afterwards, each market
maker will operate at a higher volume and charge a lower spread (since average dealing
costs decline with volume). Thus, in a monopolistically competitive dealer market, the
fall in spreads with trading volume reveals the shape of market makers' average dealing
cost function and the extent of scale economies. (See Bresnahan and Reiss (1991).) Also,
this theory predicts that it is the number of actual and not potential competitors that
best predicts the decline in spreads. For example, if the number of market makers that
could potentially make a market increases from two to ten, we would see no change in
spreads. Whereas, if the ten entered, we would see a decrease in spreads.
Table 2 and Figures 4a and 4b report how the distribution of quoted spreads and
best bid-ask spreads vary across the 1,887 SEAQ equities. In each, we condition spreads
on the number of market makers posting quotes, as opposed to the number of market
makers eligible to post quotes. We note again that this conditioning does not have a
causal interpretation. Instead, we base this conditioning on the monopolistic competition
prediction that securities with little trading volume will have few dealers, and that each
of these dealers will have higher costs. The spreads underlying the table and figure are
quarterly medians of average daily spreads. We calculated a security's average daily
spread by averaging minute-to-minute spreads during the mandatory quotation period:
8:30 am. to 4:30 p.m.. To summarize the variation in these median spreads given
a particular number of quoting market makers (i.e market structure), we report the
quartiles of these medians. Thus, the median of the median touch spreads of monopoly
dealers is 14.83 percent of price. The median touch spread in the highest six monopoly
markets is greater than 28.57 percent of price, and so on. Table 3 shows that the difference
in the median touch spreads for markets with one versus five market makers is twelve
percent of price. The inter-quartile range for five market makers is only two percent of
price. This large drop suggests there are scale economies at small volumes, and that low
volume dealers have excess capacity. The median mandatory quote volumes in the far
right column, which are based on the past twelve months' trading volume, confirm that
customer transaction costs, as measured by touch spreads, fall with trading volume.
Figure 4a graphically displays how quickly the inter-quartile range and medians of
quoted spreads fall as market concentration decreases and share volume increases. Figure
4b does the same for touch spreads. The figures and tables suggest that dealers achieveReiss and Werner: Text 18
most scaleeconomies inmarketswith mandatoryquotevolumesof£15,000to £25,000,
whichroughly corresponds to a market with five to eightdealers. Column 9ofTable 2
providesadditional supporting evidence. It shows that the median cost of a 1,000 share
trade executed at the touch falls from £57.28 when trading with a monopolist to around
£16 £20 when trading with a dealer with four to seven competitors. The quoted spreads
of the largest stocks in our sample, the FTSE-l00 equities, exhibit little inter-quartile
dispersion, conditional or unconditional on the number of market makers. A monopolistic
competition model would predict that these dealers are near the bottom of their average
dealing cost curves, which roughly corrsponds to mandatory quote volumes of £50,000
to £75,000. Based on the Exchange's rule for calculating mandatory quote volumes, this
corresponds to an annual trading volume of between £500 to £700 million.
The figures and Table 2 reveal other interesting regularities. Touch spreads fall at
roughly the same rate as quoted spreads. In percentage terms, the gap between the two
widens as the number of market makers increases. This perhaps suggests that market
makers allow themselves more leeway in moving quotes when they face greater competi-
tion. The relation is still somewhat odd, since there is no obvious reason why quoted (as
opposed to equilibrium spreads) should change with the number of competitors. Table
2 also reveals how dealers' posting behavior may affect the difference between quoted
and touch spreads. Columns ten through twelve of Table 2 show that market makers
are usually either at the best bid, best ask or setting quotes outside the market. For
instance, the median security with nine market makers will have four market makers at
the best bid and four at the best ask. Thegap between the touch and quoted spread
suggests the four dealers setting the best ask are not the same four setting the best bid.
The remaining market maker straddles both the best bid and ask. By doingso, this mar-
ket maker avoids most of the inventory and information risks associated with unsolicited
trades.
The second to last column of Table 2 reports the median number of timesper day a
market maker changes their price quotes. Although we know of no obvious benchmark
for this number, we were struck by how infrequently market makers adjust their stated
willingness to take trades. One might attribute constant quoted prices to infrequent
turnover, yet even FTSE-100 market makers change their quotes less than once per
hour! One explanation for these persistent prices is that helarge mandatory quote
volumes substantially increase market makers' capital risk. This riskcauses them to
widen spreads. By fixing wide spreads, they retain the option tovary transaction pricesReiss and Werner: Text 19
without changing quotes. We now consider how frequently they offer discounts from the
touchspread.
4. Further Evidence on Apparent Spreads
The analyses in sections 2 and 3 reveal substantial variation in spreads by security,
trader, time, and trade size. This section estimates an econometric model that iso-
lates the contribution of these factors to apparent spreads. Our data sample consists
of fourth quarter 1991 quotation and transaction histories for sixty SEAQ securities.
We randomly chose the sixty securities so that they would equally represent large (i.e.
FTSE-100), medium and small capitalization SEAQ securities. We limited the sample
to sixty securities because of the time required to match and check quotation and trade
data. The fourth quarter is the most recent we have. (See Appendix B.)
The three market capitalization classes roughly divide the sixty securities into three
volume, market structure and price size classes. Tables 3 and Al provide information on
these classes and the sample securities. Comparing Tables 2 and 3, itappears that the
sample represents the range of SEAQ dealer concentration and trading volumes. During
the mandatory quotation period, the FTSE-100 securities averaged 106 trades amounting
to £7,156,000, compared to 13 trades of £646,000 for medium, and 5 trades totalling
£83,000 for smaller equities. The average number of market makers ranges from 12.6 for
FTSE-100 equities, to 6.2 and 4.7 for medium and small equities. The quoted and touch
spread statistics in Table 3 also span those in Table 2.
Table 3 provides median quoted, touch, effective and adjusted apparent spreads for
each security. Although these medians mask intra-security variation in transaction costs,
they reveal considerable variation in spreads within and across size-classes. Most of
this inter-security variation occurs because these securities have different security prices,
and not because they have different pence spreads. For instance, Cadbury & Schweppes
(CBRY) has median touch, apparent and effective spreads of three pence. So does Abbey
National. The percentage differences in Table 3 occur because Abbey's price is two-thirds
Cadbury's price. Although on other exchanges the fixed spread might occur because of
tick size rules, the LSE does not regulate tick sizes. Thus it is puzzling that absolute
SEAQ spreads do not vary more with price. We also observe that the variation here is
similar, though perhaps more substantial, than that reported for NASDAQ firms by StoU
(1989). He reports spreads for NASDAQ/NMS stock size deciles. They range from 1.2Reiss and Werner: Text 20
to 6.9 percent of price. A recent study by Chan, Christie, and Schultz(1993) using a
more recent time period reports higher average percentage spreads for large NASDAQ
stocks.9
The within-class variation in spreads and discounts in Table 3 doesnot appear re-
lated to dealer concentration or volume. Compare, forexample, the two oil companies,
Richmond Oil and Gas (ROG) and Crossroads Oil (COl).They have the same touch and
the same number of market makers. Richmond, however, hasa much greater median
discount. The greater discount granted the median Richmond trademay reflect Rich-
mond's larger average trade size. Yet, if trade sizeexplains this difference, then why do
we not observe greater differences between Richmond and other securities?
As suggested by the analyses in Sections 2 and3, the inter-class differences in spreads
might reflect differences in trade counterparties and the volume of trade. Table4reports
information on the distribution of tradecounterparties and trade sizes for each of the
three size classes. Most trades in each classare "customer bargains"; that is, trades
where a retail customer is acounterparty. Market makers execute between sixty and
seventy-five percent of these trades. This is somewhatsurprising since the Exchange
has more than 300 brokers and just 27 marketmakers. When brokers do trade with
customers, they typically execute large transactions. Relative to othertrades, we rarely
observe agency crosses, or customer-to-customer trades.Curiously, these trades occur
more frequently among smaller (less liquid) issues. Theaverage FTSE-100equityhas 106
customer trades per day, which vastly exceeds the number ofcustomer trades for medium
(13) and small (5) equities. Although the number of'tradesper day differs substantially,
the average and median trade sizes do not.'0Thus, this table suggests that average trade
sizes alone do not explain differences in medianspreads.
The next section of Table 4 examines whetherinter-dealer trade discounts differ. If
particular types of inter-dealer trades receivelarge discounts, then we might ,expect this
to affect average spreads. As agroup, the FTSE-100 sample equities have tonsiderably
more inter-dealer trades than either the mediumor small equities. Table 3, however,
shows that the smaller equities receivegreater percentage discounts. Thus, the total
volume of inter-dealer trades does notobviously appear related to discounts. Table 4,
however,also shows that the four inter-dealer brokersystems account for an appreciable
fraction of total inter-dealer trades. Thissuggests that market makers can take advantage
of discounts offered on electronicsystems that are not offered over the phone. Together,Reiss and Werner: Text 21
these results suggest that while differences in the mix of customer and inter-dealer trades
can explain some variation in spreads and discounts, they are not the only sources of
variation.
Table 5 describes how median apparent spreads and discounts differ with trade coun-
terparties. To facilitate comparison, it contains apparent spreads and discounts expressed
as fractions of the prevailing touch- No adjustment is made for differences in the size
of trades or trading volume. As in the Cadbury example, the median trade between a
customer and a market maker receives no discount. The median customer trade through
a broker does receive a discount. These discounts are small for FTSE-100 securities and
large (one-quarter to one-third of the touch) for medium and small size class securities.
Customer crosses receive large discounts. This is not too surprising since these tra4es
usuallyinvolvelarge institutions swapping equity "baskets." Median inter-dealer trades
receive modest discounts, more so in the medium and smaller equity size classes. Most
1DB trades and trades between dealers occur at or close to touch midpoints.1' Infrequent
dealer crosses usually occur at one-half the touch. The table also shows asymmetries
exist. For example, the median discount on a medium class customer buy from a dealer
is twenty-five percent of the touch. The corresponding discount for a customer sell is
eight percent. This asymmetry reinforces our earlier point that dealer discounts may
have little to do with the touch midpoint.
Quantile Regression Results
Following the Cadbury & Schweppes analysis,.*ve can use quantile regressions to
decompose apparent spreads for these sixty securities into volume, trader and security-
specific components. In principle, we could proceed by estimating separate regressions for
each security. In practice, this approach is computationally and descriptively unweildy.
We instead estimated separate models for each size class. These specifications include
security fixed effects. Additionally, because spreads differ across securities in relation
to the security's price, we scaled the apparent and touch spreads by security prices.
Experimentation with functional forms led us to the following specification describing
customer trades for security j
(3) =so.iT0thi xioj-j-pooT0th1 +I+poiTouchi)crradesize)9+c
In words, we represent the conditional quantiles of apparent spreads as a quartic in
the trade's pound value interacted with the touch and the square of the touch. TheReiss and Werner: Text 22
coefficient fib is the apparent spread when the touch iszero. The coefficient O is a
security-specific fixed effect that captures differences in discounts from the touchacross
securities. The polynomial in size and the squared touchgive added flexibility to the
shape of the conditional median discount function. To capture differences incustomer
and non-customer trades, we included additionalzero-one dummy variables interacted
with the touch and the touch squared when the trade involvedan 1DB, a dealer, or two
market makers.
Table 6 summarizes the results of the conditional medianregressions for each size
class. The top left panel describes the fit. While there isno natural measure of fit, the
average absolute error is small and the conditional medians explain about sixtypercent of
the variation in apparent spreads (overprice). Figure 5 plots actual versus fitted values
for the medium size class. It shows that the mode! doesreasonably well explaining the
substantial variation in apparent spreads. Thesecurity specific fixed effects explain little
of the variation in apparent spreads. In futurework, we plan to investigate whether
there are more complicated security-specific sizeand trader effects. The other three
panels in Table 6 suggest that the model explainsa large fraction of the variation across
securities, but also that there are exceptions. Theinter-quartile range statistics (columns
(3) and (6)) show that trade size, touch and tradetype explain variation in apparent
spreads. The large absolute errors and standard deviationsshow, however, that there
are outlying spreads the model does not explain. We donot have an explanation for
these unusual spreads, although mostoccur because of trades outside the quoted spread.
These observations may represent matchor coding errors.
Figures 6a to 6c display estimated conditional medianapparent spreads for customer
trades by size class. The vertical distancebetween the upper curves and the horizontal
axis is the estimated apparent spread. As in theCadbury example, the vertical distance
between similar curves equals theadjusted apparent spread. Each median is evaluated
at the average of the firm effects. Figure 6aplots median adjusted apparent spreads for
FTSE-100 equities as the touchranges from 0.5 to 1.5 percent of price. These estimates
are similar to those for Cadbury. Medium andlarge trades (175,000-500,000) receive
only slight discounts when the touch is 0.5percent of price. As the touch widens, the
median FTSE-l0o trade obtains agreater discount.
Figures 6b and 6c repeat the format of Figure 6a formedium and small size equities.
The sampleaverage touches are 1.3 percent of price for the medium size class and 2.3Reiss and Werner: Text 23
percent of price for the small class. For the medium size class, median spreadsfall
monotonically as the size of the trade increases. The same is true for the small size
class,butthe decline is less pronounced. For instance, when the touch is one percent
of price, tradesgreaterthan £4,500receivevirtually no discount. Table 3 shows that a
one percent touch-to-price ratio is at the low end of medium and small sizeclass spreads.
he median FTSE-100 trade receives a greater discount the wider the touch, although
for the very largest trades (not pictured) there is evidence that suc discounts disappear.
These differences in discounts across size classes suggest that large orders have either
very different competitive or cost consequences for market makers.
We finally display the estimated median discounts for dealer trades in FTSE-100
securities holding the touch constant at one percent of price. Again, these results parallel
those in the Cadbury example. Dealer trades have a profile similar to customer discounts,
though the discount levels differ. Market makers do not discount the median trade.
Brokers grant each other approximately one-third discounts and 1DB trades execute at
roughly the touch midpoint. Translated into adjusted apparent spreads and not adjusting
for the direction of trades, this corresponds to a one-third broker-to-broker spread and a
zero 1DB spread.
5. Conclusions
This study used unique SEAQ transaction and quotation data to document SEAQ
spreads and market maker discounts. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study
to account simultaneously for differences by type of trade, trade volume and security.
We began by first developing a new measure of transaction costs, the adjusted apparent
spread. This measure incorporates information on dealers' quotes and investors' trade
characteristics to calculate the hypothetical cost of an (immediate) round-trip transac-
tion. We used quantile regressions to model how these spreads varied with trade, trader
and security characteristics. Our estimates reveal that medium to large trades on average
receive discounts from the touch spread. These discounts increase the wider the touch.
Small and very large trades pay the touch (and sometimes more). Dealers and market
makers price customer trades differently. Market makers only discount very large trades;
dealers regularly discount medium and large trades. Market makers rarely discount trades
with other market makers over the phone, but do do so when trading anonymously using
lDBs.Reiss andWerner:Text 24
The practice of discounting the touch raises many fascinating questions which need
further study. We would like to develop theoretical models that explain why dealers
grant discounti and how discounts affect spreads. We also would like to understand
why dealers link these discounts to size. The pattern we observe suggests that neither
simple asymmetric information nor inventory risk models can easily explain why dealers
widen spreads and then selectively discount. The anonymous role of IDBs in inter-dealer
trades also deserves further study. Finally, it would be useful to develop a monopolistic
competition model of market making that recognizes market makers spread their dealing
costs across different securities.
Our empirical analysis is preliminary and leaves many issues untouched or partially
addressed. We clearly should estimate adjusted apparent spreads using information about
who orginates trades. We also need to extend the data samples to explore whether dealers
individually have different discount policies. Other market maker information also should
enter our regressions. For instance, although we condition on the touch at the time of
trade, we do not control for market depth at the bid and the ask, or past information.
Additional variables might include market indicies, and capital or price risk measures.
Finally, our findings suggest that researchers should not use average spreads to mea-
sure the efficiency of a market. Instead, one should compare measures that hold constant
characteristics that market makers "price." While our research does not provide an ana-
lyticat understanding of how dealers decide on quoted and transaction prices, it provides
a place to begin..Reiss and Werner: Data Appenthx 25
Data Appendix
A. quotationand Transaction Data
TheCadbury & Schweppes NASDAQ transaction data come from the Institute for
the Study of Securities Markets [ISSMJ. On NASDAQ, Cadbury & Schweppes trades as
American Depository Receipts [ADRsJ. We converted the NASDAQ shares to pound-
equivalent shares using daily FT-Actuaries prices quoted in London.
The SEAQ data come from the Quality of Markets Group [QMG) at the London Stock
Exchange. Both the SEAQ transactions and quotations data required extensive editing
to match samples and dealer codes. For the Cadbury analysis, we use all overlapping
trade and quotation data. These data cover January 14 to March 18, April 2 to June
24, July 1 to September 24, and October 14 to December 31. In sections 3 and 4 we use
October 14 to December 31. The quotation data cover 2,000 U.K. and Irish ordinary
shares. Some securities have missing data because of retrieval problems, new listings,
delistings, or trading halts. SEAQ rules require market makers to quote guaranteed
prices and volumes between 8:30am and 4:30pm London time. Dealers sometimes post
prices for up to one-half hour before the mandatory open and close. These quotes are not
binding. During the mandatory quote period, market makers must accept trades as large
as 2.5 percent of the security's previous twelve month's average daily trading volume.
Dealers must also offer "best execution." During 1991, this meant SEAQ market makers
had to execute trades less than the mandatory quote volume at or inside the prevailing
touch. Market makers away from the touch had to execute their orders at the touch price
(or better) or refuse it.
We obtained transaction data for 907 larger U.K. and Irish securities. Approximately
840 of these equities appear in the quotation sample. The transaction data come from
end-of-day settlement reports filed with the Central Checking Section of the Stock Ex-
change. These reports do not necessarily reproduce the original ticker tape. Each trade
has two time stamps, one reported by the seller and one by the buyer. We use the seller's
time stamp unless it indicates a trade outside the prevailing touch. If the seller's time
stamp would classify the trade as outside the touch, we check the buyer's time stamp. If
the buyer's time stamp puts the trade at or within the touch, we use the buyer's time.
If neither time stamp appears valid, we use the seller's time. This reduces the number
of trades that execute outside the touch, but does not eliminate them. Trades outsideReiss andWerner:Data Appendix 26
thetouch are sometimes"average price" basket trades. Dealersexecutebaskets using
prearrangedpricingformulas.Thedataalso contain codinganomalies. The most signif-
icant are "shapes." Shapes occurwhena dealermatchesseveral customer orders with
one(sometimes two) other customer order(s). Theseappearinthe dataasaseries of
unbalanced customer transactions.
B. Pilot Samplewith Quotesand Transactions
We constructedthe sample of sixty securities by randomly sampling names from a
listof all SEAQequities.We first assigned securities on this list to market capitalization
classes based on their March 31, 1991 market capitalization.' We thenrandomly sampled
within classes, rejecting any security lacking complete data. We also required that it haye
a mandatory quote size of at least 2000 shares and more than 700 trades between March
31, 1990 to March 31, 1991. We chose the twenty FTSE-100 firms so that they would
overlap with previous London Stock Exchange studies.
Table Alprovides additionalinformation on the sixtyfirms.Reiss and Werner: Endnotes (Text) 27
Endnotes (Text)
1. Quality of Markets Review -Summer1991, pp. 17-24.
2. Some of these predictions carry over to models of dealer markets. Forpapers that
model inventory risks, see e.g. Carman (1976), Arnihud and Mendelson(1980),
andHo and StoIl (1981,1983). Admati (1991) surveyspapers that model adverse
selection risks.
3. Lee (1993) finds liquidity premia, defined as an absolute difference between trade
prices and the bid-ask midpoints, that increase with trade size.
4. See the StockExchangeQuarterly and Quality of Markets Review, Spring Edition
(1992; 27).
5. SEAQ does not require market makers to offer best execution tovery large trades.
For additional evidence on SEAQ size discounts see Breedon(1993), de Jong, Nij-
man, and Röell (1993), and Hansch and Neuberger (1993),
6. There are a few instances when market makers posted wider spreads(seven, eight,
and ten pence) but these are extremely rare.
7. Lang and Werner (1993) discuss costs associated with the arbitrage of ADRa.
8. Compare Ho and Macris (1984), Closten (1987), Glosten and Harris(1988), Stoll
(1989), Harris (1990), and Madhavan and Sniidt (1991), Hasbrouck (1991), Lee
and Ready (1991) and Lee, Mucklow and Ready (1993). See also Harris's(1990)
survey.
9. Severalstudies report lowerspreads for NYSE stocks. For instance, Kleidon and
Werner (1993)reportan average quoted spread of 0.6 percent for S&P 100 stocks
in 1991.
10. Median trade sizes (not reported in Table 3) are: FTSE-100 £3,744; medium size
£4,550; and small equities £2,625.
11. The negative adjusted apparent spreads occur because we separately estimateme-
dian spreads and discounts.Reiss and Werner: Eadnotes (Appendix) 28
Endnotes (Appendix)
1. Quality of Markets Companies Book 1991, Table 1: "1000 largest listed UK com-
panies by market valuation," p. 19-38.Reiss and Werner: References 29
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Table 6: Summary of Apparent Spread Quantile Regresssions
Table Al: Descriptive Statistics for Transactions Sample
and NASDAQ Descriptive Statistics for Cadbury & Schweppes.
Quote Statistics by Number of Market Makers.
Median Spreads as a Percentage of Average Trade Price
Trading Volume by Type of Trade
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241,211Sources: Sac data Wore drawn Irom the LSE computer ricoids fOf th. periods Janusty t4 - Match 18.
Ap.1l 2- Jun. 24. July 1 - September 24. October 14- December 27. 1991. Th, missing periods are due to
,.tri.val problems. NASDAQ data were drawn from the 153*4 tapes IoJanuasy I * December 31, 1991.
All sladstics exclude vades before 8:30(9:00) am sod after 4:30 C400) pm for Sac 94A50A0).
Note.:
(a) Th. touch spread is the average across flnsacSons of 100%AakBkO/Trad. Price.
Ø,)Aolls spread measure Is two times the squar. root of minus the s.rlal covsslaace of pric, change..
(c) The effecfiv. spread is the average across transactions of
2'IOOlTrsde Prlce-(BesI Ask's-Beat 814/2lfrrad. Price
( The votum.-welghted average of (c). See Lee end Ready (1991).
(e) Th. average discount Is the average Laos. transactions of
IorIrrade Price-Best OuotaI/Trade Price
where the Best Quote is the øid (Ask) for a customer self (buy).
(0 Capital risk is calculated based on the average stock price. Th, minimum quote size for Cadbuiy &
Schweppes Is 25,000 shares on SEAD. Exceptions are given for two marital making finns who may post
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